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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NLRA
FARM LABOR EXEMPTION
In the autumn of 1965, national attention was focused upon the
small community of Delano, California, when a group of Filipino and
Mexican-American farm workers, who had too long suffered under
intolerable working conditions, put their futures on the line, formed a
union, and went out on strike against 32 of the world's largest grape
growers.1 Today, the nation's attention has subsided, but the work-
ers' struggle continues. It is being perpetuated by the refusal of the
growers to recognize and bargain collectively with the chosen repre-
sentatives of their employees.
It is an historical fact that until employees are granted the right
to bargain collectively, any attempt to improve their working condi-
tions is futile.2 For this reason, Congress passed the National Labor
Relations Act,3 which unequivocally provides that it is an unfair
labor practice "for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with
the representatives of his employees . . . . 4 In light of such a pro-
vision, one would assume that since a grower is an employer and
farm workers are his employees, the grower would be compelled to
recognize and meet with the representatives chosen by his workers.
But such is not the case. Under the NLRA, farm workers are not
considered employees,5 and as a result they are deprived of the
rights and protection the Act affords other workers.
Legislative History'
When in 1934, Senator Wagner first introduced Senate Bill 2926,
7
which was to become the National Labor Relations Act, agricul-
tural workers were clearly within the scope of its coverage. The
Senator's bill applied to all employees, and as that term was defined,
it included "any individual employed by an employer" other than one
replacing a striking employee.8 However, several months later when
the bill was reported out of the Senate Committee on Education and
Labor, through a redefinition of the term "employee," persons en-
gaged in agricultural work were excluded from the bill's coverage.9
1 See Hearings on S. 1864, S. 1865, S. 1866, S. 1867, and S. 1868 Before
the Subcomm. on Migratory Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 89th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 361-87 (1966) (testimony of Cesar Chavez,
General Director, National Farmworkers Association).
2 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
3 Ch. 372, §§ 2-18, 49 Stat. 450 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68
(1964). The purpose for passage of the NLRA can be found in section 151.
4 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (5) (1964).
5 The Act states that "[t]he term 'employee' shall . not include any
individual employed as an agricultural laborer .... ." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)
(1964).
6 For an excellent discussion of the legislative history of the NLRA as
related to agricultural laborers, see Morris, Agricultural Labor and National
Labor Legislation, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1939, 1951-56 (1966).
7 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
8 S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(3) (1934).
9 S. REP. No. 1184, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).
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No explanation for the exclusion was given, and the Committee Re-
port reveals no reason for the change.
In 1935, hearings on Senator Wagner's bill I ° commenced in the
House Committee on Labor and were resumed by the Senate Commit-
tee on Education and Labor. Before the House Committee, testi-
mony was given which vividly portrayed the miserable working
conditions of persons engaged in farm labor and the violence which
confronted those who attempted union organization.1 Also intro-
duced was a report by Pelham D. Glassford, representing the De-
partment of Agriculture, Department of Labor, and National Labor
Board, which manifested the deep need in farm communities for the
protection and rights provided by the proposed act.' 2 Further sup-
port for the inclusion of farm workers within the bill was evidenced
by Representative Marcantonio, who strenuously argued that the need
for the bill's protection was not limited to industrial workers, but
extended to agricultural workers as well.13 In the face of such a vast
array of support for the inclusion of farm workers, only once through-
out the entire record of the hearings was any explanation for their
exclusion put forth: from the Senate Committee came the declara-
tion that it was deemed wise for "administrative reasons" to exclude
agricultural laborers, domestic servants, and persons employed by
their parent or spouse.14 Why it was "deemed wise," or what the
"administrative reasons" were, was not stated. When the bill reached
the House floor, Congressman Marcantonio strongly urged that farm
workers be included,'5 but apparently his plea fell on deaf ears, for
the bill became law without their inclusion.
As is evident, the legislative history of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act yields very little insight into the reasons for the exclusion
of agricultural workers from the protection afforded by the Act.
However, in light of the political, social, and economic conditions of
the mid-1930's, no other result could be expected. One can speculate
on at least three important factors, which, although not mentioned
in the Congressional Record, played a significant role in the exclusion.
First, the farm labor population was primarily made up of migrants,
who, because they were migrants, had no voting power and could
therefore exert very little grass root pressure on Congress. Second,
unlike their urban brethren, farm workers were not organized. 16 This
10 S. 1958, 74th Cong., Ist Sess.; H.R. 6288, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935)
(the House bill was introduced by Rep. Connery).
11 Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the House Comm. on Labor, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 27-51 (1935) (testimony by James Rorty, newspaper correspondent,
Westport, Conn.).
12 Id. at 35-38.
'3 H.R. Rm'. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1935).
14 S. RF. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935).
15 Representative Marcantonio, after describing the working conditions
of the farm workers, declared "I, therefore, respectfully submit that there is
not a single solitary reason why agricultural workers should not be included
under the provisions of this bill. The same reasons urged for the adoption
of this bill in behalf of industrial workers are equally applicable in the case
of the agricultural workers, in fact more so as their plight calls for immediate
and prompt action." 79 CoNG. REc. 9720 (1935).
16 For a general discussion see Jamieson, Labor Unionism in American
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lack of organization stemmed in part from the fact that they were
migrants and in part from the fact that potential organizers were
beaten, jailed, chased out of town, or murdered.17 The third factor,
and without doubt the most important, was the opposition to inclu-
sion of farm workers posed by the Farm Bloc. This fact was recog-
nized by Senator Wagner, who, in a letter to Norman Thomas, ex-
pressed the belief that the opposition posed by the Farm Bloc made
coverage of agricultural workers under his bill out of the question. 18
The power possessed by the Farm Bloc is easily seen when one scans
the important New Deal Legislation and discovers that farm workers
were systematically excluded from each and every act which would
have afforded them needed benefits, but which also would have cre-
ated an added burden on their employers. The first two important
acts were the National Industrial Recovery Act' 9 and the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act.20 Although industrial workers were covered
by the NIRA,2 1 agricultural workers were excluded from the AAA.
2 2
Next came the National Labor Relations Act23 which covered indus-
trial workers and excluded agricultural workers,24 as did the Social
Security Act 25 and the Fair Labor Standards Act.
26
There was on one side the unorganized, disenfranchised farm
worker and on the other, the well organized and politically power-
ful Farm Bloc. In light of this situation, even liberal Congressmen
who favored inclusion of the farm worker within the Act's coverage
were compelled to yield to the power of the Farm Bloc under
threat of defeat of the entire bill.
Constitutionality of the Exclusion
Equal Protection Under Federal Law
That legislation can constitutionally divide people or groups of
people into classes and treat the different classes differently is not
open to dispute.27 However, this power to classify is not unlimited.
State legislation is subject to the equal protection clause of the
Agriculture, U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTIcs, DEP'T OF LABOR STATISTICS,
DE'T OF LABOR BuLL. No. 836 (1945).
17 See Hearings on H.R. 6288, supra note 9, at 27-51.
18 See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare
on S. 1864, S. 1865, S. 1866, S. 1867, & 1868, 89th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 463
(1966). (testimony of Benjamin Aaron, Professor of Law and director of the
Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California at Los Angeles).
19 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (declared unconstitutional in Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
20 48 Stat. 31 (1933) (declared unconstitutional in United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1935)).
21 48 Stat. 198-99 (1933).
22 48 Stat. 31 (1933).
23 Ch. 372 §§ 2-18, 49 Stat. 450 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68
(1964).
24 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964).
25 Ch. 531 § 210(b) (1), 49 Stat. 625 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§
409(h) (2), 410(a) (1), 413(a) (2) (iv) (1964).
26 Ch. 676 § 13, 52 Stat. 1067 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 213(a) (6)
(1966).
27 E.g., F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
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fourteenth amendment, and although some early cases 28 seemed to
say that there was no federal equal protection guarantee and there-
fore no right to be free from discrimination by Congress, it was gen-
erally recognized rather early that the fifth amendment due process
clause was a limitation on the power of Congress to pass discrimina-
tory legislation.29 However, since some decisions 30 have indicated
that the fifth amendment guarantee does not go as far as the four-
teenth in protecting against such legislation, it would be wise to
determine whether or not, although not expressly mentioned, there
is in fact a right to equal protection under federal law.
In 1954, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education l
held that state legislation which segregates schools is unconstitu-
tional as an arbitrary classification in violation of the fourteenth
amendment guarantee of equal protection under the laws.32 On the
same day, in Boiling v. Sharpe,33 the Court applied the principle
laid down in Brown to the District of Columbia, notwithstanding the
absence of an express guarantee of equal protection to the District.
Chief Justice Warren, speaking for a unanimous court, justified apply-
ing the Brown doctrine to federal legislation in the following lan-
guage:
The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the District of Columbia,
does not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth
Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts of
equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American
ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The "equal protection
of the laws" is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness
than "due process of law", and therefore, we do not imply that the
two are always interchangeable phrases. But as this court has rec-
ognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of
due process.3 4
Had the Chief Justice stopped here, he would have done little more
than echo statements made by the Court on numerous occasions.3 5
However, he continued, declaring that "it would be unthinkable that
the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal
Government [than it imposes on the states]."36
The interpretations of what the Chief Justice said in Boiling
have been far from uniform. Out of 22 federal cases decided since
Warren spoke, 10 have treated the guarantees of the fifth and four-
teenth amendment as identical37 or have said that the fifth incor-
28 E.g., Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1943); Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 340 (1921) (dictum).
29 E.g., Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 14 (1939).
30 See, e.g., Charles C. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585
(1937).
31 347 U.S. 483.
32 td. at 495.
33 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
34 Id. at 499.
35 See, e.g., Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1939); Charles C. Stew-
ard Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 584-85 (1937).
36 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
37 See Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines,
Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 721-22 (1963) (dictum); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Day, 360
U.S. 548, 554 (1959) (dissenting opinion); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 295 F.2d
171, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (dictum); NLRB v. Gene Compton's Corp., 262 F.2d
porates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth,3 8 3 have said
that the fourteenth is a more explicit safeguard than the fifth39 or
that there is a greater "burden" under the fifth,40 and 9 have ap-
plied the pre-Bolling due process test, while remarking that there is
no equal protection clause applicable to federal legislation.
41
The Supreme Court has three times dealt with discriminatory
classification since Bolling. In Pennsylvania Railroad v. Day, the
Court was confronted with a problem dealing with a provision in
the Railway Labor Act 43 allowing employers to have wage claims
heard in the courts while requiring employees to submit their claims
to the National Railroad Adjustment Board for final determination.
Although the majority did not discuss the equal protection problem,
Justice Black, in a dissenting opinion concurred in by Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Douglas, declared that such a discrimination
"denies employees equal protection of the law in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."44  This language clearly
indicates that at least three Justices, including Chief Justice War-
ren, who had written the Bolling opinion, consider the equal protec-
tion and due process clauses to be interchangeable.
In the second case dealing with discriminatory classification, Col-
orado Anti-Discrimination Commission v. Continental Air Lines, Inc. 45
the Court adopted the language Justice Black used in the Pennsyl-
vania Railroad case and cited Bolling as authority.46 Then, in Schnei-
der v. Rusk,47 the Court held that classifying citizens into natural
and naturalized was an unconstitutional classification, but re-
verted to the language used prior to Bolling. The Court said that
"while the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it
does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative
653, 656 (9th Cir. 1959); Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467, 473 (5th
Cir. 1958) (dictum); Stagg, Mather & Hough v. Descartes, 244 F.2d 578, 583
(1st Cir. 1957) (dictum); Schneider v. Rusk, 218 F. Supp. 302, 320 (D.D.C.
1963) (dissenting opinion), rev'd, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Guillory v. Adminis-
trators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855, 857 (1962).
38 Brown v. McNamara, 263 F. Supp. 686, 691 n.4 (D.N.J. 1967) (dictum);
Todd v. Joint Apprentice Comm. of the Steel Workers, 223 F. Supp. 12, 19-20
(N.D. Ill. 1963).
39 Marquez v. Aviles, 252 F.2d 715, 717 (1st Cir. 1958) (dictum); United
States v. Baker, 262 F. Supp. 657, 687-88 (D.D.C. 1966) (dictum).
40 Employing Lithographers v. NLRB, 301 F.2d 20, 24 (5th Cir. 1962).
41 Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); Jensen v. United States,
326 F.2d 891, 895-96 (9th Cir. 1964); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 255 (D.C.
Cir. 1963) (dictum); Boylan v. United States, 310 F.2d 493, 500 (9th Cir. 1962);
Pacific Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 276 F.2d 350, 353 (9th Cir. 1960); Bertelson
v. Cooney, 213 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1954); Brown v. Lithographers Local
17, 180 F. Supp. 294, 305 (N.D. Cal. 1960); Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomo-
tive Firemen, 156 F. Supp. 89, 92 (N.D. Ohio 1957); Dyer v. Kazuhiza Abe,
138 F. Supp. 220, 227 (D. Hawaii 1956).
42 360 U.S. 548 (1959).
43 Ch. 347 §§ 1-228, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88
(1966).
44 360 U.S. 548, 554 (1959).
45 372 U.S. 714 (1963).
40 Id. at 721-22.
47 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [VOL 19
January 19681 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NLRA EXEMPTION 389
of due process.' "48
Thus, although the Supreme Court has had no less than three
opportunities to clarify the ambiguity created in Boiling, it has
failed to do so. However, in light of the Chief Justice's unequivocal
declaration that "it would be unthinkable that the same Constitu-
tion would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government, 49 it is
more than arguable that the Court is approaching the position that
the guarantee of equal protection should be read into the fifth amend-
ment with exactly the same force as it carries in the fourteenth.
Leaving the realm of the fifth amendment temporarily, one finds
that even more prestige is lent to the equal protection argument
when the potential of the ninth amendment is considered. The
ninth amendment to the Constitution of the United States declares
that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." 50
For the first 174 years of its history, this amendment was nearly
forgotten.5 1 Then in 1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut,5 2 Justice Doug-
las mentioned it in his search for a peg on which to hang the right
of privacy, 3 and Justice Goldberg, in a concurring opinion joined in
by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennen, more fully developed
the concept.54 Justice Goldberg observed that:
[t]he language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the
Framers of the Constitution believed that there are additional funda-
mental rights, protected from governmental infringement, which exist
along side those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the
first eight constitutional amendments. 55
Under a system of government by law, such as exists in this country,
it is believed that no right could be more fundamental than the
right to equal protection under those laws. If the constitutional
framers meant anything by the ninth amendment, they meant to
guarantee that a right so basic as the right to equal protection of
law would not be denied through the exercise of the legal maxim
inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.5"
In light of the Boiling decision and the rebirth of the ninth
amendment in Griswold, it seems to follow that federal legislation is
subject to the same test of equal protection as legislation in the
states. The problem lying ahead, which is a more difficult problem
than that already confronted, is whether or not the exclusion of
farm workers from the protection afforded by the NLRA is indeed a
denial of equal protection.
To determine whether or not the classification created by the
NLRA deprived agricultural workers of equal protection of law, it is
necessary at the outset to ascertain as explicitly as possible what is
48 Id. at 168.
49 Boling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
5O U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
51 See B. PATrER oN, THE FORGOrrSN NiTii AIENDMANT (1955).
52 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
53 Id. at 484.
54 Id. at 487-93.
5 5 Id. at 488.
58 "The inclusion of one is the exclusion of another." BLACK's LAw Dic-
TioNARY 906 (4th ed. 1951).
meant by "equal protection of law." It is clear that "equal protec-
tion" does not mean that all laws must apply universally to all people
in all circumstances. 57 Legislatures, in dealing with the diverse
problems arising out of an infinite variety of human activities, must
necessarily have the power to classify persons into groups, and for
this reason, "[t]he Constitution does not require things which are
different in fact . . . to be treated in law as though they were the
same."58  This in itself creates no problem. The problem arises
because of the fact that implied in every classification is a certain
amount of inequality, 9 and inequality is the antithesis of equal pro-
tection.
Thus there is a dilemma. On one side lies the right to equal pro-
tection of law and on the other, the necessity of classification. The
courts have sought to reconcile these conflicting interests by evolv-
ing the Doctrine of Reasonable Classification. In the words of the
Supreme Court:
[T]he classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike." That is to say, mere difference
is not enough; the attempted classification "must always rest upon
some difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the
act in respect to which the classification is proposed, and can never
be made arbitrarily and without any such basis."6 0
Or as the Court said in a recent case, "'[t]he courts must reach and
determine the question whether the classifications drawn in a statute
are reasonable in light of its purpose.' "61 This is the question which
must now be faced.
The purpose for the passage of the NLRA can be found in sec-
tion 1 of the Act itself. It is declared therein, that:
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to or-
ganize and the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of
collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial
strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of bur-
dening or obstructing commerce ....
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do
not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract,
and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of
ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of
commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by
depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of
employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce
from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of
commerce ....
57 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886).
58 Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940).
59 Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 106 (1899).
60 Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38 (1928), quot-
ing F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) and Gulf C. &
S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897).
61 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93 (1965), quoting McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 190 (1964), quoting Gulf C. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S.
150, 155 (1897).
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It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of com-
merce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they
have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and con-
ditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.62
It is evident that Congress intended the foregoing statement to
serve a dual purpose. First, it wanted to make it clear that it was
dealing with interstate commerce and was therefore acting within
the scope of power granted by the Commerce Clause. In light of the
Supreme Court decisions handed down in the years immediately
preceeding 1935,63 this was imperative. Second, and most important,
the legislators wanted to guarantee workers the right to organize and
bargain collectively. Keeping these aims in mind, it can now be
determined whether or not the classification created by the Act was
reasonable in light of its purpose.
The Act created two classes. One class, the class which Congress
called "employees," encompassed all employed persons not specifically
mentioned in the second class.0 4 The second class included farm
workers, domestic servants, and persons who worked for their parent
or spouse.0 5 It is evident that domestic servants and persons em-
ployed by their parent or spouse were excluded because they had
no need for the protection afforded by the Act. But the same cannot
be said for farm workers. What Congress said in section 1 applies as
well to farm workers as to any other kind of employee. Farm work-
ers were being denied the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively;66 there was the same if not more inequality of bargaining
power in the agricultural industry as in any other industry;67 they
were working under deplorable conditions;" and in view of the fact
that an agricultural strike would obstruct the flow of commerce as
effectively as would a steel strike, to most efficiently carry out the
purpose of the Act, it would have been reasonable to classify farm
workers along with all other workers. Therefore, unless there is some
real and substantial difference between farm workers and the work-
ers protected by the Act which would justify the exclusion, the
classification cannot be found to be a valid exercise of congressional
power.
To ascertain whether or not there is a real and substantial rea-
son for a particular classification, one would normally look to the
legislative history of the act. However, when one looks to the his-
02 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1954) (emphasis added).
03 E.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935);
Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
64 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964).
65 Id. It should be noted that because of the definition of the term "em-
ployer" in section 152(2), government, railroad, and union employees were
also excluded from the Act's coverage. When the Act was amended in 1947
(Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 137), the number of persons ex-
cluded from the term "employee" was enlarged to include independent con-
tractors and supervisors, in addition to those originally named.
6 See Hearings on H.R. 6288, supra note 11, at 27-51.
67 Id.
68 Id.
tory of the NLRA, the only justification to be found for the classifica-
tion set up therein is that it has been deemed wise for "administra-
tive reasons. '6 9  Since Congress did not say what it meant by "ad-
ministrative reasons," one can do no more than speculate on the mat-
ter. However, it would seem that the greatest administrative prob-
lems would arise through the inclusion within the Act's coverage of
persons working in a situation of one employer to one or two em-
ployees.7 0 In spite of the problem this would cause, Congress chose
to include such persons within the Act's coverage, recognizing that
"[t]he rights of employees should not be denied because of the size
of the plant in which they work."7 1 By including those who would
create the greatest administrative difficulties, Congress manifested
its belief that the need to guarantee all employees the right to or-
ganize and bargain collectively outweighs any administrative burden
created thereby. Thus, it is clear that the only reason given to
support the classification created by the legislators had no merit
whatsoever. As a result, if one were limited to the legislative history
of the Act to find a reason capable of justifying the classification,
the exclusion would fail. If any justification for the exclusion of
farm workers then existed, it must be found elsewhere.
In an article on agricultural labor and national labor legisla-
tion,7 2 Austin P. Morris found that those who favor excluding agri-
cultural workers from such legislation give two reasons to justify
their position. They contend that farm workers did not and do not
need the protection afforded by legislation such as the NLRA.7 3 This
view was expressed by Ivan McDanial while testifying before the
Senate Committee on Education and Labor in hearings on an amend-
ment which would have enlarged the scope of the term "agricultural
employee. '74 He said:
The workers and the farmer are thrown into daily close contact
with one another, in many cases they eat at a common table, their
children attend the same schools, they bow down together in religious
worship- in other words, there is that unity of contact between the
farm labor . . . and the farmer that you do not find in industrial
centers .... [A]nd this unity . . . does more to cement the labor
and employer ... than all the laws Congress can ever pass ....
The need for collective bargaining does not exist where one em-
ployer has to deal with only one or two employees .... Where
few persons are employed on a farm ... there is little likelihood of
any labor dispute arising which needs collective bargaining as a
means of settlement.7 5
It is regretable that the rosy picture painted by Mr. McDanial
does not exist, and did not exist in 1935. Throughout the 1930's there
69 See note 14 supra.
70 The Senate Committee on Education and Labor extensively considered
excluding from the Act all persons whose employer had less than 10 em-
ployees. 1 N.L.R.B., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIoNAL LABOR RELATioNs
AcT 1320 (1st ed. 1949).
71 Id.
72 Morris, supra note 6, at 1968.
73 Id.
74 Hearings on S. 1000, S. 1264, S. 1392, S. 1550, S. 1580, and S. 2123 Before
the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 3638-39
(1939).
75 Id.
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was labor strife in the agricultural arena as is substantiated by his-
torical fact7" as well as by testimony presented in the hearings on
the NLRA.77 Furthermore, it was not one employer sitting down to
dinner with one or two employees, it was a corporation or farmers
association using hundreds of employees, who, if they complained
could be replaced by hundreds more. A less distorted view of the
agricultural laborer's circumstance was given in the LaFollette Com-
mittee Report,78 where, in referring to California, it was said that:
It is an historical fact that the civil rights of agricultural laborers...
have never been successfully exercised despite a long record of un-
rest, misery, and repression. Both the cause and effect of this situa-
tion are the completely disadvantaged economical, social, and political
status of agricultural laborers. 79
Notwithstanding Mr. McDanial's statement to the contrary, it is
clear that farm workers did need the protection provided by the
NLRA as much if not more than other workers, and if need is con-
sidered to be the criterion, the classification is unreasonable.
The second reason given to justify the classification by those who
support the exclusion is that to guarantee farm workers the right
to organize and bargain collectively would impose a much greater
hardship on farmers than on other employers. 80 Those who would
support the classification on this basis stress the perishable nature of
agricultural commodities and the damage which would result if a
harvest were interrupted by a strike.81 While this is a more reason-
able argument than any heretofore expounded, it too lacks merit.
Assuming that a farmer's circumstance is such that to guarantee
workers the right to organize and bargain collectively would impose
upon him a hardship such as to outweigh the need of the workers to
possess these rights, Congress could not reasonably exclude farm
workers without excluding all other workers, who, by striking could
damage the farmer to the same extent as could farm workers.
8 2
That there are such workers who are not excluded from the Act is
indisputable. A farm worker can do no greater harm to a farmer by
refusing to pick his crop than a teamster can by refusing to haul it,
than a warehouseman can by refusing to handle it, or than a packing
shed8 3 worker can do by refusing to pack it. In each case, the
76 The United States Department of Labor, in Bulletin No. 836 (1945),
compiled a table of agricultural strikes in the United States from 1930 to
1939. It shows 275 strikes involving 177,788 strikers, in 28 states. Consider-
ing that striking deprived farm workers of what little they had to feed their
families and generally got them blacklisted, the statistics do not begin to
indicate the extent of dissatisfaction existent among farm labor. Jamieson,
supra note 16, at 17.
77 See Hearings on H.R. 6288 supra note 11, at 27-51.
78 S. REP. No. 1150, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1942).
79 Id. at 394.
80 See Morris, supra note 6, at 1970-72.
81 See Hearings on S. 1864, S. 1865, S. 1866, S. 1867, and S. 1868, supra
note 1, at 95-96 (testimony of Matt Triggs, Assistant Legislative Director,
American Farm Bureau Federation).
82 Under the Reasonable Classification Doctrine, those who are similarly
circumstanced must be treated alike. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection &
Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459, 461-62 (1937).
83 Packing shed workers devoted exclusively to handling the produce of
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farmer is going to lose his crop, and a classification which discrimi-
nates against farm workers but not against those who are in an iden-
tical position is unreasonable, arbitrary, irrational, and therefore
invalid.
Neither the reason given in the legislative history of the NLRA
nor the reasons proposed by the proponents of the classification are
sufficient to sustain the exclusion. Thus it is clear that under the
Reasonable Classification Doctrine, the classification found within
the NLRA, excluding farm workers from the Act's protective meas-
ures, has denied farm workers the equal protection of law. However,
this does not conclusively answer the question of whether or not
there has been a denial of equal protection. The Supreme Court has
developed a corollary to the Reasonable Classification Doctrine, which
is used when, for some reason it feels that a strict application of the
basic rule would be undesirable. This corollary, or modification, gen-
erally takes a form similar to that expressed in Railway Express
Agency v. New York,84 wherein the Supreme Court said, "[i] t is no
requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be
eradicated or none at all."8r
If a decision can be based solely on this rule, one is compelled
to conclude that the attempt by Congress to eradicate the inequality
existing between industrial workers and their employers without do-
ing the same for farm workers did no violence to equal protection.
However, it is suggested that this rule, standing alone, is invalid.
Through its application, inequality of the grossest form can be in-
flicted without being violative of equal protection. For example,
suppose Congress, wishing to eradicate discrimination in the sale of
housing, makes it unlawful to refuse to sell to any person on the
basis of race or color, and then declares that the term "person" shall
not include Negroes. Such a classification would clearly deprive
Negroes of the equal protection of law, yet under the rule recited in
the Railway Express case, this would be a valid exercise of classifi-
cation.
It is thus made clear that the rule expressed in Railway Ex-
press, when used as the sole test to determine whether or not there
has been a denial of equal protection, is not a valid test. However, it
must be remembered that the rule is not a test in itself, but rather
a corollary to the Reasonable Classification Doctrine. This is made
evident in the Railway Express case itself. In that case, the Railway
Express Agency attacked as a denial of equal protection, a New York
Statute which prohibited the owner of a vehicle from carrying adver-
tising for another, but which did not prohibit the use of such vehicles
for the owner's own advertising. While the court recited the "all
evils" rule, it made it clear that the "classification had a relation to
their employer are considered agricultural employees and therefore excluded
from the NLRA. Bodine Produce Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 832 (1964). However,
packing shed workers are covered by the Act if any part of the produce
packed in the shed in which they work is grown by one other than the packing
shed employee's employer (The Garin Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1499 (1964)), or if
the raw and natural state of the commodity is changed in the packing shed.
Bodine Produce Co., supra at 835.
84 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
85 Id. at 110.
[VOL 19
January 19681 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NLRA EXEMPTION 395
the purpose for which it was made . . . , and, therefore, did no vio-
lence to equal protection."8 16 Whether or not the court was correct in
considering the relation to be a "real and substantial" one, is not
here in issue. The important point is that the court, although apply-
ing the "all evils" test, used it as a corollary to the Reasonable
Classification Test.
When the rule is properly used, as it was in the Railway Express
case, it can be applied to the hypothetical situation without an unjust
result being reached. The exclusion of Negroes from the antidiscrimi-
nation act would be violative of equal protection because it has no
relation to the purpose of the legislation, not because Congress can
indiscriminately attack part of an evil while allowing another part
to continue to exist. And the exclusion of farm workers from the
NLRA is an analogous situation. The only difference being, that it
involves occupational rather than racial discrimination.
The Traditional Due Process Test
It is generally recognized that the fifth amendment due process
clause is a limitation on the power of Congress to pass discriminatory
legislation.87 Here, as in the equal protection area, there is a conflict
between congressional need to create classifications, which inher-
ently cause some inequality, and the fifth amendment requirement
that legislation not be discriminatory. And again a rule has been
created to reconcile that conflict. In the frequently cited case of
Nebbia v. New York,88 the Supreme Court said that due process de-
mands that the classification "not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capri-
cious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial
relation to the object sought to be attained."
8 9
Applying this rule to the classification created within the NLRA,
it is obvious that the exclusion is a violation of fifth amendment due
process. As was seen in the discussion on equal protection, the ob-
ject of the NLRA was twofold. Congress intended to remove from
interstate commerce the obstruction caused by labor strife and to
create equality of bargaining power between labor and management.
One of the means used to obtain this objective was to classify
farm workers so as to exclude them from the Act's coverage. The
question then is whether or not excluding farm workers had a real
and substantial relation to either the removal of the obstruction to
commerce caused by labor strife or to the creation of equality of
bargaining power between employees and their employers. Clearly
it did not. The exclusion had no relation to the object of the Act.
Thus, if the test the Court used in Nebbia can be literally ap-
plied, the conclusion that farm workers were deprived of their fifth
amendment rights appears to be unavoidable. However, as was seen
in the discussion of equal protection, Supreme Court language cannot
always be applied literally. For this reason, it would be wise to
examine any cases that are somewhat analogous to the present issue.
Three such cases have been decided.
80 Id.
87 See e.g., Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 338 (1943).
88 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
89 Id. at 525.
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The first two cases, Brown v. Lithographers Local 1790 and Em-
ploying Lithographers v. NLRB91 involve identical factual situations
and can therefore be discussed together. In both cases, lithogra-
phers' unions brought actions to have the exemption of garment
workers from section 8(e) of the Labor Management Relations Act
92
declared unconstitutional on the ground that lithographers' work is
similar to that of garment workers, yet lithographers were not ex-
empted from the section. 93 In both decisions the exemption was up-
held. In Brown the court said:
Assuming, that there might be a discrimination of such injurious
character as to bring into operation the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment .... mere lack of uniformity in the Congressional
exercise of the Commerce Power does not constitute a denial of due
process....
In this field the Congress need not deal at one time with all the
evils it may observe.94
While Brown can be distinguished from the NLRA situation in
that valid reasons for the exemption of garment workers can be
found in the Act's legislative history,95 it is worth noting that the
Court relied on the "all evils" test discussed earlier. The Brown
Court has fallen into the same trap courts fall into when deciding
cases under the equal protection clause. Instead of saying that the
classification is valid because it is reasonable, it says it is valid be-
cause Congress can focus on an evil and apply its legislation only to
some of the people creating the evil. As was seen above, this is
not only erroneous, but can be dangerous as well. The court in
Employing Lithographers v. NLRB9 6 decided the case on the correct
ground. It looked into the legislative history of the Act and discov-
ered therein that there were valid reasons for the classification
created. Since there was a valid reason for the classification, neither
case can be used as support for the claim that the exclusion of farm
workers from the NLRA is not a denial of fifth amendment due
process.
The third case is NLRB v. Edward G. Budd Manufacturing Com-
pany.97 This involved an attack on the exclusion of foremen from
the protection afforded by the Labor Management Relations Act.
In upholding the exclusion, the court said:
It is equally well recognized that Congress has broad discretion in
making statutory classifications, [and] that such a classification is not
invalid if it bears a reasonable relation to the purposes of the legis-
lation .... 98
It is then pointed out that "[i]n enacting the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, Congress gave careful consideration to the pro-
posal to exclude supervisory personnel from the definition of em-
90 180 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Cal. 1960).
91 301 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1962).
92 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964).
98 Section 8(e) is a prohibition against secondary boycotts.
94 180 F. Supp. 294, 305-06 (N.D. Cal. 1960).
95 Id. at 306.
96 301 F.2d 20 (5th Cr. 1962).
97 168 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1948).
98 Id. at 578.
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ployees." 99 The court concludes that in light of the fact that "[t]rade
union history shows that foremen were the arms and legs of manage-
ment in executing labor policies"'0 0 and that "in industrial conflicts,
they were allied with management,"'0 1 the decision by Congress to
treat them as part of management "was based upon substantial and
real considerations, and was not an arbitrary or unjustifiable classifi-
cation." 02 Thus, the Budd case could not be used to support the
constitutionality of the classification which excluded farm workers.
In creating that classification, Congress did not base its decision on
real and substantial considerations, but instead upon the demand of
the Farm Bloc.
Conclusion
For over 30 years the working class in the United States has been
protected by the National Labor Relations Act. This protection has
without doubt created the prosperity which the mainstream of
American life is today experiencing. However, because of the politi-
cal power of the Farm Bloc, the agricultural worker has not had the
opportunity to join in this prosperity. Whether or not the courts will
remedy this injustice is yet to be seen. It is possible that they will
close their eyes and merely repeat the statement so often heard, that
Congress has no obligation to eradicate all genera of an evil at one
time, or they may find the classification reasonable, thereby leaving
the farm worker to the mercy of the grower with whom he cann6t
possibly compete. On the other hand, if the enlightened Supreme
Court with which we are presently endowed were confronted with
the issue, it is not at all unlikely that it would arrive at the con-
clusion that cannot be avoided: farm workers for 32 years have been
deprived of their constitutional right to equal protection and due




100 Id., quoting Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 496 (1947).
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